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11 January 1966

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


# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
2. Dominican Republic: Current situation report.  
(Page 3)
3. India-Pakistan-USSR: Tashkent declaration goes  
beyond what either side seemed prepared to con-  
cede. (Page 5)

- 
5. India: Prospects for a successor to Shastri.  
(Page 8)

6. Note: UK-Rhodesia. (Page 10)



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 January 1966

\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)


The Military Situation in South Vietnam: There have been no reports during the past 24 hours of significant enemy contact resulting from allied operations in South Vietnam. The major US and Australian effort being conducted in Hau Nghia Province has resulted so far in friendly casualties of 10 killed (6 US) and 64 wounded (49 US). Viet Cong losses are 84 killed (body count), 38 captured and 495 suspects detained.

On 9 January, an estimated battalion of Viet Cong attacked a hamlet defended by a Regional Force company in central Long Khanh Province. A government relief battalion dispatched from the provincial capital of Xuan Loc reached the hamlet yesterday but made no contact with enemy forces. Two Viet Cong suspects were apprehended. Government losses totaled seven killed, one wounded, 21 missing, and 55 weapons lost. On the same day in Binh Long Province, another enemy attack of estimated battalion strength inflicted 24 government casualties on a Vietnamese platoon. Viet Cong losses were unknown.

[The Political Situation in South Vietnam: Deputy Premier and Defense Minister General Co recently expressed to US officials concern about the montagnard problem in the central highlands, and said that further outbreaks of violence might occur at any time. He said that he planned to convene a conference, including representatives of the government and of the tribes, in Pleiku later in the month. Co hoped that Premier Ky would chair the conference, and that it would be an occasion at which a new government program for the montagnards would be presented.]

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
## SOUTHEASTERN LAOS



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Communist Military Developments: A recently positioned roadwatch team on Route 911 in the Laotian panhandle has reported the movement of 197 southbound and 64 northbound trucks in a five-day period between 27-31 December. This is the first report received from trained observers on Route 911 since the road was opened in November. Villager sources had reported that the road was in use, however.

The volume of traffic reported thus far suggests that Route 911 is serving as an important alternate to the northern section of Route 23. Reports from a roadwatch team positioned on Route 23 indicate that an average of nine southbound trucks per day has moved on the road since 11 November when the first significant movement of trucks this season was noted. This compares to an average of 17 southbound trucks per day counted during the last dry season.



25X1

11 Jan 66

2

\*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)

The general strike called by extreme leftist forces yesterday appeared to be only partially effective, and negotiations were intensified to bring about the departure of leading military officers from both Caamano's forces and the regular armed forces.

The strike appeared to be gaining momentum yesterday morning as government employees began leaving their offices and a series of street disorders broke out. US officials reported, however, that private industries and commercial concerns in Santo Domingo were open for business [and the taxi drivers, viewed as a bellwether during past strikes, were not supporting the walkout.]

By mid-afternoon the capital was reportedly quiet following forceful action by determined and heavily armed Dominican police reinforced by troops from the Inter-American Peace Force. Reports from the interior indicate that the strike call was not being honored. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

11 Jan 66

3



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India-Pakistan-USSR: The Tashkent declaration signed yesterday by President Ayub and the late Prime Minister Shastri went beyond what either side seemed prepared to concede a week ago.

The declaration calls for the withdrawal of troops to positions held prior to 5 August, when Pakistani infiltrations into Kashmir began. Withdrawal is scheduled for "not later than" 25 February, leaving seven weeks in which new difficulties might arise to delay implementation.

The Indians had previously refused to vacate the posts they captured in northern Kashmir without firm guarantees against renewed Pakistani infiltrations. The Indian concession on this point, which may come under heavy fire from hard liners in New Delhi, is probably the result of persistent Soviet encouragement.

Other key provisions of the declaration were agreements to repatriate prisoners of war and to improve economic and cultural ties. Shastri and Ayub also promised to continue meetings at "the highest and other levels" on other questions concerning both sides. As in the case of the withdrawal issue, however, the effectiveness of these provisions remain uncertain, especially in view of the sudden death of Shastri yesterday.

Ayub's acquiescence in measures designed to bury the hatchet without any accompanying concessions on Kashmir may deepen the frustration of the more militant Pakistanis, who will now argue that the losses incurred during the recent conflict were in vain. Ayub may feel, however, that Moscow's subordination of its support of India in the interests of maintaining peace on the subcontinent is in itself a significant step forward.

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11 Jan 66

5

Premier Kosygin can return to Moscow satisfied that he has achieved the limited objectives the USSR had hoped for in convening the meeting. The withdrawal agreement and several other statements in the declaration probably underscore Kosygin's success in bringing India and Pakistan together, apparently without irritating either party. Soviet relations with Rawalpindi were improved, and Pakistani leaders will, in the future, give more weight to Moscow's role in resolving the Kashmir dispute.

The USSR was also able to strengthen its position as an Asian power and lay claim to the role of peace-maker in contrast with the "incendiary" attitude of Peking throughout the crisis. The coincidence of the Tashkent talks with Shelepin's trip to North Vietnam and Brezhnev's visit to Mongolia further highlighted the USSR's present efforts to isolate Peking.

25X1

11 Jan 66

6

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\*India: The sudden death of Prime Minister Shastri confronts the Indian leadership with the difficult task of finding a suitable successor at a time when the nation faces grave economic and foreign problems.

The selection of Home Minister Nanda as Prime Minister is almost certainly an interim appointment. Nanda, 67, served in a similar caretaker capacity for a week following Nehru's death in 1964. He is ambitious and may see himself as a dark horse candidate for selection by the Congress Party as a permanent prime minister. His lack of an independent political base and widespread criticism of his handling of previous cabinet portfolios, however, make him an improbable choice.

Machinery for selecting a successor to Shastri is already in operation. Congress Party President Kamaraj has scheduled a meeting of senior party officials for this Friday and a caucus of the party hierarchy will probably follow within the next week or so. The selection presumably will be more difficult and may be more bitterly contested than it was in 1964 when Shastri was the leading candidate.

Among the leading possibilities for the prime ministership are Defense Minister Chavan, former minister of finance Desai, Congress Party President Kamaraj, Minister of Steel and Mines Reddy, and Minister of Information Indira Gandhi. Chavan, who took over the Defense Ministry in 1962 for V. K. Krishna Menon, has built up the armed forces and has shared with Shastri the acclaim for what most Indians consider a military victory over Pakistan last fall.

Desai lost a major bid for prime minister in 1964 and appears to have been losing political strength since that time, but his reputation for incorruptability and his administrative ability could still make him an attractive candidate to many Congress Party members.

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11 Jan 66

8

Kamaraj, perhaps the most powerful political force in India and a strong believer in party unity, probably would prefer exercising his power behind the scenes to stepping into the prime ministership. Reddy and Mrs. Gandhi probably would become serious contenders for the post only if a deadlock developed among the other candidates.

25X1

[\* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.]

11 Jan 66

9

25X1

NOTE

UK-Rhodesia: [Prime Minister Wilson apparently hopes to get through this week's Commonwealth conference in Lagos without giving in to African pressures for stronger action against Rhodesia. According to the US Embassy in London, the cabinet has decided against announcing a total economic break at Lagos or publicly committing Britain to withhold Rhodesian independence until majority rule is established. If necessary, however, Wilson will probably take whatever steps he feels are needed in the hope of restraining the Africans from imprudent actions.]

25X1

11 Jan 66

10

25X1

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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